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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff/Respondent

;

vs.
MARK R. THURSTON,

>.

Case No. 880593-CA

Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal from a judgment and commitment after
two second degree felony convictions.

Jurisdiction of this Court

is therefore conferred by 78-2a-3 (2) (f), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS
Appellant having been charged with various crimes all
of which were felonies in two separate informations, negotiated
with the State through the Davis County Attorney's Office to
allow him to plead guilty to two second degree felony counts of
distribution of controlled substances.

In exchange for the

guilty pleas the State aareed to recommended probation to the

sentencing Court.
At the time of the sentencing the County Attorney's
Office did recommend probation; however, Davis County Deputy
Sherrif Lon Brian the investigating Officer, recommended that the
appellant be incarcerated

in the Utah State Prison.

His

recommendation as noted by the Court was made in the strongest
possible terms with the investigating Officer saying:

"Fifteen

years is not long enough for this Defendant".
At the time of sentencing, the appellant objected to
the statement provided by Lon Brian and requested that the Court
disregard that statement.

The Court refused to disregard the

recommendation of the Police Officer and indicated at the time of
sentencing that the statement provided by Lon Brian did have an
"impact"

upon him and he was "influenced by that information" in

sentencing the defendant to prison.

The District Court then

sentenced the defendant to an indeterminate term in the Utah
State Prison from 1 to 15 years.
Appellant, feeling that the bargain that he had reached
with the State had been breached, moved to set aside his guilty
plea or for resentencing (specific performance of the agreement)
on the basis that the plea bargain he had entered into had been
broken by the State, arguing that the State must be speak with
one voice in terms of plea bargaining.
2

He further asserted that

it makes a sham of the plea bargaining process to allow the State
to agree to a certain bargain and then allow the investigating
Officer to circumvent the negotiated bargain by taking a position
exactly opposite to that of the State's official position as
reflected by the County Attorney's Office.
The Court denied appellant's Motion to withdraw the
guilty plea or for resentencing, and from that Order appellant
appealed.
In a separate proceeding the District Court granted
appellant a Certificate of Probable Cause and the appellant is
currently free on an Appeal Bond.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
POINT I

DID THE STATE BREACH THE PLEA
BARGAIN IN VIEW OF INCONSISTENT
SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY
THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AND THE
INVESTIGATING OFFICER?

POINT II

IS THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER BOUND
BY THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A
PLEA BARGAIN BETWEEN A CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT AND THE STATE BY AND
THROUGH THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE?

POINT III

WAS THE DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA
VOLUNTARY IN VIEW OF THE ILLUSORY
NATURE OF THE STATE PROMISE AND THE
DEFENDANT'S EXAGGERATED BELIEF IN
THE BENEFIT OF THE PLEA?

3

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
The controlling statutes, constitutional provisions
etc., have been reproduced verbatim in the Addendum to this brief
and they are as follows:
There are no Determinative Constitutional Provisions,
Statutes, Ordinances, and Rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
lc

Nature of the case.

Appellant was convicted of two

second degree felonies and sentenced to the Utah State Prison on
those convictions for an indeterminate term of 1-15 years on a
guilty plea which he unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw, and it
is from that Order denying his Motion to Set Aside the Guilty
Plea that he appeals.
2.

Course of proceedings.

Appellant was convicted of

two second degree felonies and sentenced to the Utah State Prison
on those convictions of an indeterminate term of 1-15 years on a
guilty plea which he unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw, and it
is from that Order denying his Motion to Set Aside the guilty
plea that he appeals.
3.

Disposition of trial court.

Appellant was

convicted of two second degree felonies and sentenced to the Utah
State Prison on those convictions of an indeterminate term of 115 years on a guilty plea which he unsuccessfully attempted to
4

withdraw, and it is from that Order denying his motion to Set
Aside the guilty plea that he appeals.
4.

Relevant facts.

At appellant's change of plea

hearing the County Attorney representing the State had this to
say:
"and then we have some sentencing recommendations that
we've agreed to enter into as well. . .basically Your
Honor this is a first offense. The State has looked
over the file in the situation and the State is
prepared to recommend that Mr. Thurston be place on
probation rather than any type of incarceration.
That
would be our recommendation."
(Tr of hearing 8/17/88
p.p. 2-3)
At the time of sentencing the defendant had an
opportunity for the first time to review the presentence report
that was prepared by Adult Probation and Parole in which the
Officer recommended in the strongest terms possible that the
defendant be incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. (Tr. of
Hearing 8/17/88 p. 1-4.)
At that same hearing the defendant objected to the
Court considering the recommendation of the police officer and
asked the Court to disregard that recommendation in pronouncing
sentence.

The Court indicated that it was "impressed' by what

the recommendation of the police officer was. (Tr. of Hearing
8/17/88 page 9.)
The Court reaffirmed that the officer had recommended
15 years in Prison as not being long enough for the defendant.
5

(Tr. of hearing at page 9)
Appellant feeling that the bargain that he had reached
with the State had been breached moved to set aside his guilty
plea of for resentencing on the basis that the plea bargain he
had entered into had been broken or breached by the State.
argued unsuccessfully that in terms of negotiating

He

with a

criminal defendant the State must speak with one voice in terms
of plea bargaining and by law that voice is the County Attorney
or the Prosecuting Attorney.

He further asserted that it makes a

sham of the plea bargaining process to allow the State to agree
to a certain bargain by and through the County Attorney's Office
and them allow another agency of the State i.e. the investigating
officer to circumvent the negotiated bargain by taking a position
exactly opposite to that of County Attorney's Office, or the
representative of the State.

(Tr. of hearing 9/27/88 P.P. 7-12.)

The Court denied appellant's Motion to withdraw a
guilty plea or for resentencing in an Order dated October 7, 1988
and it is from that Order that appellant filed this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The S t a t e breached t h e plea bargain with a p p e l l a n t by
taking

inconsistent

positions

regarding

sentencing

recommendations one of which was made by the County A t t o r n e y ' s
Office

and t h e o t h e r of which was made by t h e
6

investigating

officer-

These sentencing positions were completely at odds with

one another-

The County Attorney as the attorney for the State

recommended probation.

The investigating officer as part of the

"prosecution team" recommended Prison in the strongest possible
terms.

Since the bargain was breached appellant should be

entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.
The Police Officer investigating a case and working as
part of the "prosecution's team" is bound by the terms and
conditions of a plea bargain between a criminal defendant and the
State.

The State should be required to consult with the

investigative agency involved in a case before it extends any
offer to a criminal defendant, and once that offer is extended it
should be binding upon the investigating agency.
Appellant's guilty plea was not voluntary in view of
the illusory promise of probation and the appellant' s
exaggerated

belief in the benefit of the plea, in view of the

investigating officer's contrary recommendation to the sentencing
Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE STATE BREACHED THE PLEA BARGAIN
IN VIEW OF INCONSISTENT SENTENCING
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S MADE BY THE
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AND THE
INVESTIGATING OFFICER.
Appellant should be entitled to withdraw his guilty
7

plea because the plea bargain that he entered into with the State
was breached by the State in taking inconsistent positions
regarding an important aspect of the bargain.
The United States Supreme Court in Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495 (1971) has dealt with the issue
of a plea bargain which was not kept.

In Santobello, the defen-

dant, after having negotiated with the prosecutor, withdrew his
previously entered not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea
based upon the prosecutor having agreed to make no recommendation
at the time of sentencing.

At the defendant's sentencing hearing

held several months later, a new prosecutor recommended the
maximum sentence.

The defendant then attempted unsuccessfully to

withdraw his guilty plea and his conviction was affirmed on
appeal in the State court.

The Supreme Court reversed the

conviction, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case back to
the State court for further consideration.

The Supreme Court in

remanding the case back to the State had the following to say
about plea bargain arrangements at 92 S.Ct. 499:
This phase of the process of criminal justice, and
the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea
of guilty must be attended by safeguards to assure the
defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances.
Those circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is
that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can
be said to be part of the inducement or consideration,
such promise must be fulfilled. (Emphasis added.)
8

In the case at bar, appellant contends that it makes
very little sense for the State, through its authorized representative, i.e., the County Attorney's Office, to agree to a particular recommendation when an agency working under its direction
can circumvent that agreement and recommend, as in this case, the
harshest possible sentence in the strongest possible words.

The

appellant negotiated the plea agreement with the State of Utah,
by and through its legal representative, the County Attorney's
Office.

In that negotiation, it was felt important to acquire

the recommendation of the State that the appellant be given
probation.

It is appellant's position that that recommendation

binds the State and the investigating officer.

A violation of

that agreement occurs when an agency of the State recommends
something other than what was negotiated.
Utah has followed the Santobello precedent in State v.
Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 ( Utah 1976) where the prosecutor promised
to recommend probation to the sentencing Judge.

On appeal the

defendant claimed that the State had not fulfilled it's promise.
This court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the recommendation had been included in the
probation report.

The Supreme Court held that if it had not been

included the defendant was "entitled to have his sentence set
aside and to be resentenced with the benefit of his bargain."
9

The Utah Supreme Court cited with the approval the Santobello
principle and remanded the case back to the trial court for a
hearing to determine whether or not the sentencing Judge had the
benefit of the States recommendation for probation at the time of
sentencing.

This was what the defendant had bargained for in

Garfield and the Supreme Court held that the State was bound by
that bargain.
POINT II

AN INVESTIGATING OFFICER IS BOUND
BY THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A
PLEA BARGAIN BETWEEN A CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT AND THE STATE OF UTAH AS
NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT
AND THE COUNTY A T T O R N E Y WHO
REPRESENTS THE STATE OF UTAH.
As provided in 77-1-5 Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as

amended) a criminal action for violation of the State statute,
such has occurred in this case, is to be prosecuted in the name
of the State of Utah.

The State of Utah in that criminal

prosecution is represented by either the Attorney Generals Office
or one of the various County Attorney's Offices throughout the
State.
As provided for in 77-2-1 Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as
amended) no information is to be filed charging a class A
misdemeanor or above without having first been authorized by a
prosecuting attorney.

And the commencement of prosecution means

the filing of an information or an indictment which has been
10

authorized for filing by the prosecuting attorney.
The entire criminal justice system from the State's
point of view is overseen and controlled by a prosecuting
attorney.

A criminal defendant in negotiating a case deals with

a prosecuting attorney and the statements made by the prosecuting
attorney are authorized statements made by the state in connection with a criminal prosecution.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Shibata, 678 P.2d
785 (Utah 1984) in ruling upon a possible violation of a
discovery order in withholding exculpatory evidence, held
essentially that knowledge possessed by the police officers is
charged to the prosecutor where it said at 678 P.2d 788:
At the outset, we stress that we are concerned with
more that the prosecutor's state of knowledge regarding
the sale of cocaine or other drug activity by the
witness. Information known to police officers working
in a case is charged to the prosecution since the
officers are a part of the prosecution team. (some
emphasis added.)
As the Shibata case held, there is a prosecutor's team
which includes not only the prosecuting attorney, but the
officers investigating the case.

Knowledge possessed by one is

knowledge possessed by the other.

In the case at bar, recommend-

ations made by one, i.e., the prosecutor, is a recommendation
made by that prosecuting team, including the investigating
officer.
11

It would simply make a sham and mockery of the criminal
justice system for this Court to impliedlly authorize police
officers to disregard recommendations made by the prosecuting
attorney or in other words the attorney for a party to the law
suit, when that same officer is part of the prosecuting team.

It

would be similar to a defendant retaining a law firm to represent
him and allowing two attorney's from that law firm to negotiate
conflicting agreements regarding a plea bargain and then force
the State to be bound by the most lenient of those bargains.
Certainly if a defendant attempted to negotiate directly with the
Attorney General's Office and circumvent the County Attorney's
Office in connection with the case that would not occur.
Certainly the Attorney General's Office could not appear at the
sentencing hearing and circumvent a bargain that was reached
between the defendant and the State, through the local County
Attorney's Office.
It is clear that trial courts need direction and
criminal defendant's need assurances that the States speaks with
one voice and is that voice is the prosecuting attorney and that
everyone involved in the prosecution of the case is bound by that
one voice.
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POINT III

APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT
VOLUNTARY IN VIEW IF THE ILLUSORY
NATURE OF THE PROMISE THAT THE
STATE MADE IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS
GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE THE APPELLANT
HAD AN EXAGGERATED BELIEF IN THE
BENEFIT OF THE PLEA. IE., A
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROBATION.
It is clear from the record that the appellant relied

upon the recommendation of the State that he receive probation.
It is certainly true that that recommendation is not binding upon
the Court nor is it binding upon Adult Probation and Parole,
however, a recommendation is a recommendation and it was the
recommendation of the State.

His reliance upon that recommend-

ation was misplaced and hence his guilty plea involuntarily
entered because of the inconsistent positions taken by the
investigating agency and the Prosecuting Attorney's Office.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Copeland, 97 adv.
rep. 3, 9, (Utah 1988) considered a case involving "illusory
promises" or those promises which either the State cannot or will
not be able to fulfill.

In Copeland, the defendant entered a

guilty plea based upon the apparent State recommendation for
hospitalization when under the statute that he was charged under
a minimum mandatory prison sentence was the only possibility,
there the court said:
The record suggests the possibility that defendant did
not understand the value of the commitments made to
him. If the State promised to recommend hospitaliza13

tion rather that a prison sentence of if the defendant
understood this to be the promise, then he "pled with
an exaggerated belief in the benefits of his plea,"
and he should be allowed to withdraw his plea....
The Utah Supreme Court then went on to affirm the
continued vitality of Santobello v. New York, (supra) in Utah.
The record suggests the possibility that
defendant did not understand the value of the
commitments made to him. If the State promised to
recommend hospitalization rather than a prison
sentence or if defendant understood this to be the
promise, then he "pled with an exaggerated belief
in the benefits of his plea," and he should be allowed
to withdraw his plea....
Finally, we address the fact that the State may
not have fulfilled the promise that it made to defendant. The trial judge suggested at the sentencing
hearing that even if the State did not keep its promise
to recommend a sentence, defendant would not be allowed
to withdraw his plea because he was informed at the
arraignment of the conseguences of the crime and that
the recommendations were not binding on the court. We
have difficulty with the court's suggestion that the
State's failure to keep its promise would be of no
consequence.
Because of the confusion associated with whether or not
the defendant in Copeland relied upon an illusory promise to
induce him to plead guilty, the Supreme Court remanded the case
back to the District Court with instructions to determine the
exact recommendation promised by the State, the defendant's
understanding of that promise, and whether the State fulfilled
its promise, concluding:
14

If it is found as a matter of fact either that the
State promised to recommend commitment to the Utah
State Hospital or that defendant understood this to be
the promise without knowing that it was without value
or that the State did not fulfill its promise,
defendant should be allowed to withdraw his plea.
In the case at bar, the defendant clearly relied upon
the State's recommendation for probation in entering his guilty
plea.

He does not contend that this recommendation is binding

upon the Court; it simply is not.

However, he does contend that

the recommendation made by the State through the County Attorney's Office, its legal spokesperson, is binding upon the State
and binds all those involved in the prosecution.

To rule

otherwise would reduce the concept of plea bargaining to a sham
and mockery.

Certainly, if a police officer is free to recommend

prison in the strongest possible terms notwithstanding the
State's recommendation for probation, then in this particular
case the recommendation was clearly "illusory" as outlined in
Copeland, supra, and for that reason, if for no other reason,
appellant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea or for
specific performance of the plea agreement.
CONCLUSION
The trial courts Order denying the appellant's Motion
to withdraw his guilty plea or in the alternative force specific
enforcement of the plea bargain should be reversed and this case
15

remanded back to the District Court for trial or inforcement of
the bargain
Respectfully submitted this

day of May, 1989.

BROWN & COX

AU^^-T^

By

/<

/?A

Kenneth R. Brown
Attorneys for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of May, 1989 I

mailed a true and correct cpoy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief
was mailed to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, Postage prepaid.
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